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To meet its overall objective of ensuring food security for all households, the 
Government of Bangladesh undertakes several activities: it intervenes in markets to 
stabilize prices, targets food distribution to poor households and provides emergency 
relief after natural disasters.  This paper provides measures of the variability of domestic 
and international rice prices, and examines the mix of government intervention and 
private sector participation in rice markets.  The analysis shows that the relatively high 
degree of price stability achieved in the 1990s was due in large part to private sector 
imports that stabilized markets following major production shortfalls.  Domestic rice 
procurement contributed relatively little to raising domestic producer prices at harvest 
time, involved only a small percentage of farmers, and incurred excessive costs following 
successful harvests because of procurement prices set far in excess of market prices.    
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Ironically, less than one year from the massive floods of 1998 and the concerns of 
imminent food shortages, excessively low prices, rather than high prices dominated the 
short-term food policy debate.  Bumper crops of wheat and boro rice in the first half of 
1999 suddenly brought large surpluses to markets, leading the Ministry of Food to 
increase procurement targets, and which resulted in a large build-up of government 
stocks.  This rapid turnabout in market conditions and public perceptions illustrates both 
the natural instability of foodgrain production and markets in Bangladesh and a major 
reason why the Government of Bangladesh intervenes heavily in rice and wheat markets. 
Food policy in Bangladesh has several objectives, though basically the major 
objective is ensuring food security for all households.  In attempting to meet this 
objective, the Government of Bangladesh undertakes several activities, including open 
market sales of foodgrain to limit foodgrain price increases, targeting food distribution to 
poor households, providing emergency relief after natural disasters, and procuring 
foodgrain to support producer prices and incomes. 
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2 Research Director, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), E-17, Agargaon Sher-e-Bangla 
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Government food policy has both price and quantity aspects, and given fiscal, as 
well as stock constraints, it is not always possible to meet all objectives.  For example, no 
specific floor and ceiling prices are set.  Rather, the government attempts to influence 
domestic market prices through limited purchases (domestic procurement), sales or 
distribution of specified quantities of foodgrains.  Likewise, programs designed to 
alleviate poverty and household food insecurity such as Food For Work (FFW) and 
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) are limited by the extent of resources available, 
particularly in the form of food aid. 
This paper examines the mix of government intervention and private sector 
participation in food markets in recent years, and analyzes policy options related to price 
stabilization.  In particular, the focus of the paper is on the role of trade liberalization, and 
impacts of domestic procurement on rice prices.   
Chapter two examines data on price stability in Bangladesh in comparison to 
international market prices.  Long-term trends in real prices are also examined, 
particularly in reference to import and export parity.  Chapter three reviews recent stock 
modeling exercises for Bangladesh and discusses the role of international trade in 
stabilizing domestic rice and wheat markets in the 1990s.  Chapter four analyzes 
domestic procurement, summarizing the experience of fixed price domestic procurement 
in recent years, and estimating the impact of domestic procurement on market prices and 
potential cost-savings of procurement by tenders versus fixed price procurement.  
Conclusions are presented in chapter five.  
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2.  TRENDS AND VARIABILITY OF RICE PRICES IN BANGLADESH  
AND WORLD MARKETS 
Since Independence, the Government of Bangladesh has attempted to reduce 
variability of rice prices, and especially to prevent sharp increases in price.  This chapter 
analyzes historical price trends and variability in Bangladesh, and compares them to price 
trends and variability in India and Thailand (the world￿s leading rice exporter).  First, 
inter-year (annual) and intra-year (seasonal) prices in Bangladesh are analyzed.  In order 
to separate out price trends from seasonal or random elements, price fluctuations are 
measured as deviations from the moving average of prices and from a linear trend.  Price 
changes relative to the price in the preceding period are also discussed. 
RICE PRICES IN BANGLADESH: ANNUAL AND SEASONAL PATTERNS
3 
Annual price fluctuations in Bangladesh arise mostly from fluctuation in 
production, which again can be attributed to the random effect of floods and drought.  
Prior to 1994, public imports, and to a lesser extent drawdown of stocks, were the main 
policy instruments to achieve year-to-year stability in prices.  As will be discussed below, 
since the trade liberalization of 1994, the private sector import trade has been the 
dominant factor in keeping price rises within acceptable limits in case of a domestic 
production shortfall.  Seasonal price variations are generated by seasonality in  
production.  The policy instruments that are used to keep seasonal price spreads within 
acceptable limits are domestic procurement, which attempts to raise average prices (and 
farmer incomes), and Open Market Sales (OMS) and other sales channels, designed to  
                                                 
3 This section draws heavily from Shahabuddin (1998), estending the analysis to 2001.  
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moderate prices to consumers when there are severe upward pressure on prices. 
 
Fluctuations in Annual Rice Prices in Bangladesh 
 
Year-to-year fluctuations in nominal prices of rice in Bangladesh were very high 
during the seventies, ranging from 9.1 to 108.6 percent, (Table 2.1).  Prices were 
especially unstable during the early seventies (1973/74 - 1975/76) due to severe rice 
shortages caused by drought-related production shortfalls and shortage of foreign 
exchange for government rice imports.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the range of price 
fluctuations diminished (3.0 percent to 30.9 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent to 27.3 
percent in the 1990s).  Year-to-year fluctuations greater than 10 percent occurred in 5 out 
of 7 years during the 1970s as compared with 4 out of 10 years during the 1980s and 7 
out of 10 years during the 1990s.  By this measure, the decade of the 1980s enjoyed a 
greater degree of price stability than the 1990s. 
In order to distinguish between trend and random elements of fluctuation in 
prices, trends are calculated using a three-year centered moving average, (which provided 
a better fit to the data than did a simple linear trend, Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  Deviations 
from the moving average were quite large (between 2.8 and 44.7 percent) during the 
1970s and became much smaller during the 1980s (between 0.1 and 14.4 percent) and the 
1990s (between 1.7 and 11.7 percent). 
Moreover, the deviations of actual prices from the moving average greater than 5 
percent occurred 6 out of 7 years during the 1970s, only 5 out of 10 years during the 
1980s, and 7 out of 10 years during the 1990s.  The patterns remain the same if we 
consider the deviation of actual prices from the linear trend.  Thus, by several measures,  
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annual rice prices displayed a greater degree of stability during the 1980s than in the 
1970s, but fluctuations in rice prices again increased in the 1990s. 
 
Table 2.1￿Fluctuations in Annual Rice Prices, 1973/73 to 2001/02 
 
    Changes    Deviation of  Deviation of 
  Actual  from  3 years  actual price  actual price 
  Price  Previous  Moving  from Moving  from Linear 
Year  (Tk/kg)  Year ( % )  Average  Average ( % )  trend ( % ) 
  
1972-73 2.01  -  --  -  -27.0 
1973-74 2.69  33.6  3.44  -21.8  -13.9 
1974-75 5.61  108.6  3.88  44.7  60.8 
1975-76 3.34  -40.6  3.99  -16.5  -13.5 
1976-77 3.03  -9.1  3.36  -9.7  -28.2 
1977-78 3.71  22.2  3.60  2.8  -19.2 
1978-79 4.07  9.9  4.39  -7.2  -17.7 
1979-80 5.39  32.3  4.66  15.7  1.4 
          
1980-81 4.51  -16.3  5.27  -14.4  -20.6 
1981-82 5.91  30.9  5.62  5.1  -2.4 
1982-83 6.44  9.1  6.45  -0.1  0.4 
1983-84 7.01  8.8  7.11  -1.5  3.4 
1984-85 7.89  12.5  7.47  5.6  10.4 
1985-86 7.51  -4.8  8.08  -7.1  -0.1 
1986-87 8.85  17.9  8.58  3.2  12.3 
1987-88 9.37  5.9  9.33  0.5  13.7 
1988-89 9.76  4.1  9.53  2.4  13.3 
1989-90 9.47  -3.0  9.97  -5.1  5.5 
          
1990-91 10.69  12.9  10.39  2.9  14.4 
1991-92 11.03  3.1  10.28  7.3  13.6 
1992-93 9.12  -17.3  9.91  -7.9  -9.5 
1993-94 9.57  5.0  10.29  -7.0  -8.3 
1994-95 12.19  27.3  11.25  8.3  12.8 
1995-96 11.99  -1.6  11.32  5.9  7.3 
1996-97 9.79  -18.4  11.08  -11.7  -15.2 
1997/98 11.48  17.3  11.68  -1.7  -3.6 
1998/99 13.77  19.9  12.50  10.2  12.2 
1999/00 12.24  -11.0  12.50  -2.0  -3.1 
2000/01 11.48  -6.2  11.89  -3.5  -11.7 
2001/02 11.96  4.2  --  --  -10.5 
          
          
Source: DAM, MOA and author￿s calculation. 
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Fluctuations in Monthly Prices in Bangladesh 
 
Table 2.2 shows the extent of fluctuations in monthly prices for the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s.  Two indicators are presented.  The first indicator is the simple range - the 
difference between the lowest and the highest monthly price indices.  For each year, the 
January price is chosen as the base, and is set equal to 100.  The second indicator is the 
coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation of the monthly prices in a year, 
divided by the average price.   
As indicated by the first indicator, monthly price fluctuations exceeded 30 percent 
in 6 out of 8 years during the 1970s, the period characterized by years of post-liberation 
turmoil and famine in Bangladesh.  Monthly price fluctuations exceeding 30 percent,  
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however, occurred in only 2 out of 10 years during the 1980s, and 3 out of 10 years 
during the 1990s.   
Judged by the second indicator also, rice price fluctuations were quite pronounced 
during the 1970s.  The coefficient of variation of monthly rice prices exceeded 10 percent 
in 6 out of 8 years in the 1970s, compared with only 2 out of 10 years in the 1980s and 3 
out of 10 years in the 1990s.  
Thus both annual and monthly rice prices displayed a greater degree of stability 
during the 1980s compared with the 1970s.  Two major factors likely account for this 
change.  First, the phenomenal growth of irrigated rice in the boro season (which raised 
the share of boro rice in total production from about 15 percent in the mid-1970s to about  
30 percent in the late 1980s) increased stability of production and resulted in a more even 
distribution of market arrivals of rice due to multiplicity of harvests in each year.  
Second, improved infrastructure and enhanced capacity of the government and farmers to 
undertake effective rehabilitation activities may have reduced the magnitude of 
production shortfalls caused by natural disasters, thus contributing to improved supply 
stability. 
Nonetheless, the frequency of large year-to-year fluctuations in the average 
annual rice price again increased during the 1990s, though as discussed above, the range 
of these annual price fluctuations (measured against the moving average) was slightly 
smaller than both the 1970s and 1980s.  
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Table 2.2￿Fluctuations in Monthly Nominal Prices of Coarse in Bangladesh 
 
    Coefficient of  Month of      Month of 
Year  Fluctuation Variation  Lowest price  Highest price 
        
1972-73 43.5  0.137  July 
May 
1973-74 59.1  0.206  December  June 
1974-75 58.0  0.170  July  March 
1975-76 85.0  0.242  June  July 
1976-77 40.6  0.115  December  June 
1977-78 18.8  0.058  December  July 
1978-79 63.3  0.177  August  June 
1979-80 28.4  0.084  June  July 
        
1980-81 21.1  0.061  December  April 
1981-82 54.3  0.172  August  April 
1982-83 19.7  0.059  December  October 
1983-84 20.4  0.075  August  April 
1984-85 19.7  0.055  June  September 
1985-86 21.5  0.067  August  April 
1986-87 46.9  0.121  November  April 
1987-88 16.1  0.053  May  March 
1988-89 16.0  0.052  July  April 
1989-90 19.1  0.048  December  April 
1990-91 29.6  0.096  November  October 
1991-92 17.3  0.050  November  April 
1992-93 34.1  0.109  November  July 
1993-94 41.8  0.143  July  June 
1994-95 25.3  0.076  July  February 
1995-96 16.8  0.056  May  July 
1996-97 20.7  0.063  January  May 
1997-98 38.9  0.157  August 
April 
1998-99 15.5  0.061  June  February 
1999-00 11.1  0.031  January  May 
2000-01 16.7  0.047  August  October 
2001-02 13.4  0.058  July  March 
        
Average: 1972/73 - 1979/80  49.6  0.149     
Average: 1980/81 - 1989/90   25.5  0.076     
Average: 1990/91 - 2001/02   23.4  0.079     
 
Notes : (a)  Price fluctuation is measured as the difference between the highest and lowest index numbers;  
the index number is based on the January price as 100 and constructed separately for months in a year.  (b) 
The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean. Source: Authors’ calculations.   
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Figure 2.2: Fluctuations in the Annual Wholesale 
Price 





































Wholesale Price Centered Moving Average
 
 
Figure 2.2￿Fluctuations in the Annual Wholesale Price of Coarse Rice, 1972/73 to 
2001/02 
Seasonality of Rice Prices in Bangladesh 
 
The seasonal component is defined as the intra-year pattern of variation that is 
repeated from year to year.  The seasonal index is calculated by taking the averages for 
each month, of the ratio of the price to a 12 month moving average.  
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3 show the seasonality index for the late 1970s, the 1980s 
and the 1990s.  Three major changes in the seasonality index can be observed.  First, the 
ratio of the peak price to trough price gradually declined over time, from 1.236 in the late 
1970s to 1.161 in the 1980s to 1.103 in the 1990s.
4  The seasonal price spread thus has  
declined significantly (almost cut down by half) during the 1980s and the 1990s as  
                                                 
4 The 1990s figure covers 1990/91 ￿ 2001/02.  
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compared to the earlier decade.  Second, the month of peak price changed from July in 
the late 1970s to April in both the 1980s and the 1990s.  Third, the pattern of prices from 
April to October changed markedly.  In the late 1970s, prices continued to rise after a 
small drop from April to May.  In the 1980s, there was a drop in prices from April to 
June and stable prices from June to August.  In the 1990s, prices have on average 
remained at the same level from May to October. 
 
Table 2.3￿Seasonal Price Indices of Coarse Rice (National Average) 
 
  1977/78 - 1980/81 - 1990/91 - 1983/84-  1993/94 - 
  1979/80 1989/90 2001/02 1992/93  2001/02 
        
January  0.923 0.987 1.002 0.997  1.024 
February  0.942 1.021 1.040 1.020  1.063 
March  0.993 1.064 1.065 1.059  1.087 
April  1.049 1.092 1.072 1.082  1.085 
May  1.018 1.005 1.015 1.005  1.033 
June  1.075 0.958 0.984 0.977  0.993 
July  1.112 0.969 0.985 0.999  0.986 
August  1.058 0.955 0.985 0.992  0.983 
September  1.065 1.009 1.002 1.033  0.993 
October  1.021 1.022 1.018 1.044  1.005 
November  0.952 0.983 0.973 0.988  0.985 
December  0.900 0.941 0.987 0.958  1.006 
        
Peak  1.112 1.092 1.072 1.082  1.087 
Trough  0.900 0.941 0.973 0.958  0.983 
Ratio  1.236 1.161 1.103 1.129  1.106 
 
 Source: Authors￿ calculations from DAM data.  
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Notes: This graph uses a 12 month lagged moving average.   
1970s data are for 1976/77 ￿ 1978/79. 
1990s data are for 1989/90 ￿ 2001/02. 
 
 
The increase in the size of the boro harvest relative to aman and aus is the major 
factor behind these observed changes in seasonality.  The increase in the share of boro 
(and aus) in total production have eliminated the steep seasonal rise in prices in June and 
July observed in the late seventies and resulted in relatively stable prices from May to 
October.  As a result, the ratio of peak to trough has been reduced. 
Note that the decline in the magnitude of seasonal price fluctuations is not as 
steep when comparing the post- rice import trade liberalization period: 1.106 in 1993/94-
2001/02 compared with 1.129 in the preceding decade, (1983/84 ￿ 1992/93).  The major 
reason for this smaller decline is that the magnitude of seasonal price fluctuations was 
especially high in the early 1980s (the ratio of the peak to trough for 1983/84-92/93 is   
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only 1.129 compared to 1.161 for 1980/81-89/90).  Thus, these figures suggest that the 
magnitude of seasonal price fluctuations did not change significantly following the trade 
liberalization. 
 
Fluctuations in Annual Rice Prices in International Markets 
 
An in the case with domestic rice prices, the fluctuations in annual world prices of 
rice (ex-Bangkok, C & F Chittagong, 15% broken) have been measured both in reference 
to the previous year’s price (nominal fluctuations) as well as a moving average (Table 2.4 
and Figure 2.4).  The fluctuation in nominal prices ranged between 10.0 to 34.7 percent 
during the 1970s, between 0.0 to 39.1 percent during the 1980s and between 0.7 to 27.1 
percent during the 1990s.  The extent of fluctuations in nominal prices thus seemed to 
have increased during the 1980s compared to the 1970s, but the range of price 
fluctuations declined in the 1990s to almost the same range as obtained during the 1970s.  
Another way of looking at this is that year-to-year fluctuations greater than 10 percent 
occurred in 5 out of 6 years during the 1970s, 5 out of 10 years during the 1980s and only 
4 out of 10 years during the 1990s.   
Deviations from the moving average indicate that the range of fluctuations in 
prices which was rather small (4.3 and 13.5 percent) during the 1970s became larger 
during the 1980s (0.5 and 18.5 percent) but became smaller again during the 1990s (0.0 
and 11.0 percent).  Moreover, the deviations of actual prices from the moving average 
greater than 10 percent occurred in 3 out of 6 years during the 1970s, 3 out of 10 years  
13 
 
Table 2.4￿Fluctuations in International Rice Prices, 1973/74 to 2000/01 
          
   Nominal Price  Changes from 3 year  Deviation of Deviation of
  C & F ( Thai  Previous  Centered  Actual price Actual price
  15 % Broken )  Year  Moving  from Moving from  Linear
Year  (US $ / Mt)  (%)  Average  Average (%) Trend(%)
 
1973-74 482  - - - 40.1
1974-75 319 -33.82 347 -8.1 -6.3
1975-76 240 -24.76 276 -12.9 -28.7
1976-77 268  11.67 290 -7.5 -19.5
1977-78 361  34.70 318 13.5 9.6
1978-79 325  -9.97 369 -11.9 -0.2
1979-80 421  29.54 404 4.3 30.8
  
1980-81 465  10.45 392 18.5 46.1
1981-82 291 -37.42 344 -15.4 -7.5
1982-83 276  -5.15 277 -0.5 -11.2
1983-84 265  -3.99 257 3.1 -13.7
1984-85 230 -13.21 234 -1.6 -24.2
1985-86 206 -10.43 211 -2.4 -31.3
1986/87 197  -4.37 226 -12.7 -33.4
1987/88 274  39.09 255 7.3 -6.3
1988/89 295  7.66 288 2.4 2.2
1989/90 295  0.00 291 1.5 3.5
  
1990/91 282  -4.41 287 -1.7 0.3
1991/92 284  0.71 271 4.7 2.3
1992/93 248 -12.68 266 -6.8 -9.4
1993/94 266  7.26 266 0.0 -1.5
1994/95 284  6.77 304 -6.5 6.6
1995/96 361  27.11 325 11.0 37.4
1996/97 331  -8.31 330 0.4 27.8
1997/98 297 -10.27 306 -3.0 16.3
1998/99 291  -2.02 267 8.9 15.6
1999/00 214 -26.46 225 -4.7 -13.7
2000/01 169 -21.18 - - -30.9
  
Average: 1973/74 - 1979/80  345  1.23 334 9.70 15.85
Average: 1980/81 - 1989/90  279  -1.74 278 6.54 17.94
Average: 1990/91 - 2000/01  275  -3.95 285 4.76 14.72
 
Sources: Authors￿ calculations from FAO and USDA data. 
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during the eighties and only 1 out of 10 years during the nineties.  Thus in terms of 
number of years with large deviations, (for both year-to-year fluctuations and deviations 
from the moving average trend), annual world prices of rice displayed a progressively 




Figure 2.4￿Fluctuations in International Rice Prices, 1973/74 to 2001/02 
 






















































































































                                                 
5 It may be noted here that this conclusion also remains valid when Thai 5% broken parboiled rice prices 
are used.  
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Table 2.5 presents a comparison of price variability of Bangladesh wholesale 
prices, Indian prices and Thai prices for the late 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s.  
Variation in annual prices is measured using the coefficient of variation in each period, 
i.e. the standard deviation of prices divided by the mean price level.  The prices of Indian 
and Thai rice are converted to import parity Dhaka using a constant percentage marketing 
margin of 30 percent for Indian rice and 10 percent for Thai rice.
6   
 
 
Table 2.5￿Fluctuations in Annual Nominal Rice Prices 
 
       1975-76     1980-81   1990-91   1984/85    1994-95 
   - 1979/80  - 1989/90  - 1999/00 - 1993/94  - 2000/01 
            
Bangladesh   Average  3.91 7.71 11.14 9.32  11.85
National Average     
Coarse Rice (Tk/Kg)  Coef of variation 0.210 0.218 0.126 0.106  0.093
            
India Perimal Rice  Average  n.a. 4.29 9.01 5.45  10.10
Import Parity      
Bangladesh (Rs/kg)  Coef of variation n.a. 0.124 0.209 0.289  0.123
            
Thai 5% Brokens  Average  353 316 305 276  298
Parboiled Rice     
C&F Chittagong ($/ton) Coef of variation 0.135 0.284 0.135 0.131 0.201
            
Thai 15% Brokens  Average  323 279 288 257  281
White Rice     
C&F Chittagong ($/ton) Coef of variation 0.200 0.257 0.143 0.141 0.227
 
Notes :   For India, data for the 1980s are from 1984/85 to 1989/90. 





                                                 
6 Multiplying prices by a constant percent marketing margin makes no difference to the coefficient of 
variation since it increases the standard deviation and the mean by the same factor.  
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As shown, the coefficient of variation of Bangladesh coarse rice prices fell 
sharply in the 1990s, from 0.218 in the 1980s to 0.126 in the 1990s.  The variability of  
Thai prices was also reduced in the 1990s, with the coefficient of variation of the price of 
15 percent broken rice falling from 0.257 in the 1980s to 0.143 in the 1990s.  Indian 
prices, measured in rupees, actually became more variable in the 1990s, with the 
coefficient variation increasing from 0.124 (for 1984/85 to 1989/90) to 0.209 in the 
1990s.   
Expressing the prices of Indian rice in Taka, the variability of Indian rice prices 
changes little from the mid-1980s to the 1990s, however (Table 2.6).  The coefficient of 
variation increases from 0.095 to only 0.118, because the depreciation of the Indian rupee 
relative to the Taka offsets much of the changes (increases) in the rupee price of Indian 
rice.  Thai prices expressed in Taka are also generally more stable than in dollar terms, 
particularly for the 1980s.  Bangladesh coarse rice prices had higher coefficients of 
variability than either Indian or Thai rice prices (expressed in Taka) in the 1980s.  In the 
1990s, however, Bangladesh prices were on average lower than import parity prices for 
Indian and Thai rice, and less variable than Thai import parity prices.  
Even though Bangladesh was, on average, a rice importer throughout the entire 
period considered here, domestic rice prices were not consistently determined by import 
parity.  Up until the liberalization of the private sector rice trade in 1994, government 
imports and stock policy were the major determinants of rice prices and the Bangladesh 
market was to some extent insulated from world market fluctuations. Even after the 
liberalization, however, domestic rice prices were significantly below import parity levels 
in the mid-1990s during a period of consecutive good rice harvests.  
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Table 2.6￿Fluctuations in Annual Nominal Rice Prices in Bangladesh Taka 
 
   1975-76 1980-81  1990-91 1984/85  1994-95 
   - 1979/80  - 1989/90 - 1999/00 - 1993/94  - 2000/01
    
Bangladesh   Average  3.91 7.71 11.14 9.32  11.85
National Average     
Coarse Rice (Tk/Kg) 
Coef of 
Variation  0.210 0.218 0.126 0.106 0.093
            
India Perimal Rice  Average  n.a. 9.50 11.89 9.99  12.87
Import Parity      
Bangladesh (Tk/kg) 
Coef of 
Variation  n.a. 0.095 0.118 0.097 0.099
            
Thai 5% Brokens  Average  5.38 8.10 12.90 9.32  13.77




Variation  0.145 0.168 0.146 0.202 0.113
            
Thai 15% Brokens  Average  4.93 7.25 12.17 8.71  12.93




Variation  0.212 0.202 0.152 0.217 0.131
 
Notes:   For India, data for the 1980s are from 1984/85 to 1989/90. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
 
These periods of low prices both increased the variability of prices for the decade as well 
as reduced the average price level in comparison with import parity.   
Table 2.7 shows average prices and coefficients of variation for rice prices 
expressed in real terms, i.e. adjusted for overall price inflation.
7  Bangladesh rice prices  
are deflated by the non-food consumer price index, Indian prices are deflated by the 
Indian wholesale price index and Thai prices (expressed in dollars) are deflated by the 
                                                 
7 Although policy-makers generally focus on short-term variations in nominal price, measuring prices in 
real terms offers a better comparison of price fluctuations over long periods.    
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U.S. wholesale price index.  In real terms, all coefficients of variation are lower, except 
for Thai rice in the 1980s.  Bangladesh real rice prices were slightly more variable in the 
1990s than in the 1980s; Thai real rice prices were much more stable in the 1990s than in 
the 1980s, though only slightly less stable than Bangladesh real rice prices in the 1990s.  
Indian real rice prices were extremely stable in the late 1980s and only slight less stable 
in the 1990s.  
 
Table 2.7￿Fluctuations in Annual Real Rice Prices 
 
    1975-76    1980-81     1990-91     1984/85    1994-95 
  - 1979/80  - 1989/90  - 1999/00  - 1993/94  - 2000/01 
Bangladesh   Average  19.01  17.41  12.29  15.02  12.16 
National Average            
Coarse Rice (Tk/Kg)  Coef of Variation  0.160  0.091  0.103  0.190  0.100 
            
India Perimal Rice  Average  n.a.  9.86  11.29  10.37  11.34 
Import Parity             
Bangladesh (Rs/kg)  Coef of Variation  n.a.  0.097  0.039  0.094  0.045 
            
Thai 5% Brokens  Average  636  386  312  312  300 
Parboiled Rice            
C&F Chittagong 
($/ton)  Coef of Variation  0.071  0.326  0.106  0.108  0.180 
            
Thai 15% Brokens  Average  577  340  295  290  283 
White Rice            
C&F Chittagong 
($/ton)  Coef of Variation  0.110  0.295  0.118  0.114  0.206 
            
 
Notes :   (a) For India, data for the 1980s are from 1984/85 to 1989/90. 
(b) Bangladesh prices are deflated by the non-food CPI. 
(c) Indian prices are deflated by the Indian wholesale price index. 
(d) Thai prices are deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index. 





Finally, Table 2.8 shows average real prices and coefficients of variation for rice 
prices expressed in real Taka.
8  In real Taka terms, both Indian and Thai rice prices 
became more stable in the 1990s.  Bangladesh real rice prices were slightly more stable 
than Thai import parity prices, but less stable than Indian import parity rice prices during 
the 1990s.  
A comparison of the coefficients of variation of the period since rice import trade 
liberalization (1994/95-2001/2002) and the previous decade (1984/85 ￿ 1993/94) shows 
than Bangladesh prices became slightly more stable in nominal terms (Table 2.6) and 
much more stable in real terms, with the coefficient of variation in the latter period about 
half the magnitude of the coefficient of variation in the former period (0.100 and 0.190, 
respectively, Table 2.8).  As discussed in the next chapter, the stabilizing influence of 
private sector imports from India at moderate and very stable prices during times of 
domestic production shortages in Bangladesh limited price increases.  In contrast, Thai 
rice prices were more variable in real terms (in both dollars and Taka) in the late 1990s as 
compared to the earlier period.  India￿s domestic price stabilization efforts thus had 
positive spillover effects on Bangladesh rice markets.
                                                 
8 Prices in real Taka are calculated by converting international prices to nominal prices in Taka using the 
relevant exchange rates, and then deflating by the Bangladesh non-food consumer price index.  
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Table 2.8￿Fluctuations in Annual Real Rice Prices in Bangladesh Taka 
 
      1975-76    1980-81    1990-91    1984/85    1994-95 
   - 1979/80  - 1989/90  - 1999/00  - 1993/94  - 2000/01 
    
Bangladesh   Average  19.01 17.41 12.29 15.02  12.16
National Average    
Coarse Rice (Tk/Kg)  Coef of Variation  0.160 0.091 0.103 0.190  0.100
            
India Perimal Rice  Average  n.a. 17.35 13.09 15.62  13.15
Import Parity     
Bangladesh (Tk/kg)  Coef of Variation  n.a. 0.148 0.065 0.191  0.050
            
Thai 5% Brokens  Average  26.28 19.13 14.20 14.58  14.18
Parboiled Rice    
C&F Chittagong 
(Tk/kg)  Coef of Variation  0.129 0.290 0.110 0.109  0.145
            
Thai 15% Brokens  Average  24.03 16.85 13.40 13.55  13.34
White Rice    
C&F Chittagong 
(Tk/kg)  Coef of Variation  0.191 0.252 0.120 0.103  0.170
            
 
Notes :   (a) For India, data for the 1980s are from 1984/85 to 1989/90. 
(b) Bangladesh prices are deflated by the non-food CPI. 
(c) Indian prices are deflated by the Indian wholesale price index. 
(d) Thai prices are deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index.  
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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Summary  
 
The above discussion has presented a number of different indicators to measure 
variability of prices: the range of period-to-period fluctuations of nominal prices, range of 
variations from trend, number of times prices deviate by more than a given percentage 
from trend, and coefficients of variation.  Moreover, for each of these measures, several 
options are available including the choice of trend (e.g. linear or moving average), the 
percentage cutoff for defining a ￿large￿ variation, and the frequency of observations (e.g. 
monthly or annual data).  The period chosen for comparison can also potentially affect 
the results, (e.g. comparing prices by decade or by shift in policy regime).  Finally, in 
comparing prices across countries, a conversion of data to a common currency (which 
captures the combined effects of price changes expressed in domestic currency and 
exchange rate changes) is needed to compare domestic prices with import or export parity 
prices.   
No single measure completely quantifies price variability.  Measures involving 
the number of years that price fluctuations are ￿large￿ relative to recent prices or a price 
trend may be most relevant to policy ￿makers and politicians who are concerned with the 
public￿s perceptions of annual price fluctuations, but involve somewhat arbitrary 
definitions of a ￿large￿ variation.  Measures involving average variations (e.g. 
coefficients of variation) give a better quantitative estimate of the distribution of prices, 
but obscure the difference between several years of moderate price variations and a few 
years of large price variations.  Fortunately, the different measures give similar results, 
suggesting that some general conclusions are robust.    
22 
 
First, since the 1970s, Bangladesh rice prices have become more stable, both 
annually and seasonally.  Comparisons between the 1980s and 1990s, trends in price 
instability are mixed, varying by the measure used.  Year-to-year fluctuations greater than 
10 percent occurred more frequently in the 1990s (7 out of 10 years) compared to the 
1980s (4 out of 10 years), as did deviations from the moving average of more than 5 
percent (7 out of 10 years in the 1990s compared with 5 out of 10 years in the 1980s).  
Coefficients of variation of nominal prices fell sharply, though coefficients of variation of 
real prices increased slightly.  Seasonality of monthly prices was reduced in the 1990s, 
however.  In short, prices were approximately as stable in the 1990s as in the 1980s, and 
in any case, there is no evidence of a sharp increase in variability in the 1990s.  
World prices of rice, for example Bangkok prices, however have clearly become 
more stable over time, as the volume of world trade has grown.  In the 1990s, Bangladesh 
domestic prices expressed in Taka were approximately as stable as world prices 
expressed in dollars.  In the 1990s, though, Indian prices in real terms were most stable 
(all measured in terms of coefficients of variation).  Expressed in Taka, import parity 
prices of Indian rice were only slightly more stable than Bangladesh domestic prices as 
measured by the coefficients of variation, though in real terms the difference is somewhat 
larger.  Import parity prices of Thai rice were slightly more variable than Bangladesh 
prices in both nominal and real terms.  In short, Bangladesh annual prices were slightly 
more stable in the 1990s than international (Thai) prices, though Indian prices, heavily 
influenced by Indian government market interventions, were the most stable of the rice 




3.  STOCK POLICIES, PRICE STABILIZATION AND THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Stabilization policies and stock management are closely linked to international 
trade.  Although one argument for building up a national security stock is to avoid the 
risks of large price increases in international markets, in practice, operation of a national 
food security stock almost inevitably involves imports in some years, perhaps later sold 
in the domestic market at subsidized prices.  Up until 1993, the Government of 
Bangladesh relied exclusively on maintenance of public foodgrain stocks, supplemented 
in emergencies with additional food aid and government commercial imports, to achieve 
its price stabilization objectives.  With the liberalization of the private sector trade in 
wheat in 1993 and rice in 1994, private sector imports, especially of rice, successfully 
stabilized prices and augmented domestic foodgrain supplies following major production 
shortfalls in 1997/98 and 1998/99.   
This section begins with a review of the major lessons from several stock 
modeling exercises in recent years, based on Goletti and Rich (1998).  The extent to 
which import parity has provided a ceiling for rice prices in recent years is then 
examined.  The section concludes with a discussion of why export parity has failed to 
provide a floor for rice prices. 




Stock and price stabilization analyses are often characterized by complex models 
involving dozens of equations.  The major lessons from these models, however, are not 
                                                 
9 This section is based on Goletti and Rich (1998).  
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complicated.  In fact, many of the insights gained derive essentially from the necessity to 
clearly specify policy objectives, instruments and constraints in setting up a model. 
Policy-makers in the real world face difficult decisions involving tradeoffs 
between objectives, given constraints on financial resources, and in the short-run (of 
several months), stock levels.  For example, though the basic objectives are clear, such as 
supporting producer prices and farmer incomes through domestic procurement, in 
practice the government may lack the financial resources or the storage capacity to 
procure all the grains required to actually raise market prices for producers significantly. 
In essence, the Ministry of Food has two major objectives, price stabilization 
(especially for rice) and food distribution (largely in wheat, mostly funded by food aid).  
Given financial resource constraints, it is often not possible to meet fully both these 
objectives.  Stock modeling exercises have typically attempted to determine which 
policies can achieve the objectives of price stabilization (especially for rice) and public 
distribution targets to poor households at lowest cost.  These exercises, though lacking in 
the details of specific policy situations, nevertheless do shed light on policy tradeoffs. 
Perhaps the most important lesson of stock modeling is that the composition of 
foodgrain stocks affects the capacity of achieving alternative objectives.  While rice price  
stabilization can be achieved primarily with rice stocks, food security objectives can be 
achieved at a lower cost primarily with wheat stocks. 
Goletti, Ahmed and Chowdhury (1991) and Brennan (1995) show that the 
composition of the stocks is related to the effectiveness of stock management.  If the 
primary objective is food security for the poor, as in the case of several program 
distribution channels (VGD, VGF, FFW, FFE, GR), then wheat should be the main grain  
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used.  If, on the other hand, rice price stabilization is the primary objective, then market 
interventions should be conducted with rice.  This is due to three main reasons.  First, the 
cross-price elasticity of rice demand with respect to wheat price is very low, implying 
that movements in wheat prices have little influence on rice demand and prices.  As 
shown by Goletti, Ahmed and Chowdhury (1991) and Ahmed-Shams (1994), the cross 
price elasticity of demand between wheat and rice is close to zero.  That is to say that to 
affect market prices of rice through wheat interventions would require huge amounts of 
wheat.  On the other hand, the own price elasticity of rice is relatively high (most 
estimates in the literature range between -0.3 and -0.5).  Therefore, a much lower quantity 
of rice would be needed to affect rice prices.  Even though rice is more expensive than 
wheat (typically about 20 percent higher in Bangladesh), the savings in quantity would 
amply compensate the price differential.  The second reason is that in spite of rice being 
more expensive than wheat, its nutritional value is similar to that of wheat (approximately 
345 kilocalories per kg).  Therefore, the same quantity of wheat would provide similar 
nutritional value than rice but cost much less.   
The third reason is that the target groups for food programs in Bangladesh are 
usually at such a low poverty level, that market interventions to stabilize rice prices 
would not have any effect on their effective demand.  Brennan (1995) has shown that rice 
price stabilization would have the greatest impact on the middle income group and has 
little impact on the average degree of poverty experienced by the lowest income quartile 
in Bangladesh, confirming similar results by Goletti 1994.  Wheat stocks would be 
largely determined by planned distribution and the key issue becomes that of targeting 
effectively (that is identifying the beneficiaries) and efficiently (that is avoiding leakages  
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and storage losses. The objective of increasing household food security is unquestionable, 
and given the availability of food aid as a resource, the role of government is essential.  
Whether meeting the price stabilization objective is worth the costs is less clear.  
In spite of a large public support for rice price stabilization, the economic case for 
stabilization is not very strong.
10  The analysis by Goletti (1994) and Brennan (1995) 
leaves doubts about the advisability of pursuing price stabilization.  If economic benefits 
exist at all, these are likely to be rather small, unless households are extremely risk averse 
(i.e. unless they place a very high value on price stability).  Even as a mechanism to 
reduce poverty in the short term, price stabilization is not very effective.  Targeted 
programs conducted with wheat would seem to be more appropriate. 
The case made by Ravallion (1987) for price stabilization during times of famine 
was based on the experience of the 1974 famine.  Ravallion suggested that price 
stabilization would have reduced the number of victims of the famine.  The case of 1974, 
however, does not seem to be a good guide for policy making in the 1990s given that 
domestic and international conditions are rather different.  Even in the "crises" of 1994-
95 and 1998, price hikes were much lower than in the case of 1974.  One reason for this 
is that improvements in informational efficiency, infrastructure, and market integration 
facilitated market flows that kept prices in any one region from rising above prices in  
neighboring regions by more than normal marketing and transport margins would justify 
(Goletti, 1993 and 1994, and del Ninno, Dorosh, Smith and Roy, 2001).  Moreover, as  
                                                 
10 Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Islam and Thomas (1996) and Goletti (1994) review the analytics of price 
stabilization, in which benefits are usually characterized in terms of changes in consumer and producer 
surplus.     
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described below, private sector imports, made possible by trade liberalization in the early 
1990s, have helped stabilize prices and foodgrain availability in periods of domestic 
production shortfalls.   
Nonetheless, price stabilization is important politically.  In spite of a quite 
different domestic and international environment, the memory of the famine of 1974 is 
still present.  High rice prices in Bangladesh are treated as a crisis situation, and are often 
interpreted by critics as a failure of the government to ensure food security.  As such, 
high rice prices point to the need of the government to intervene, even though this 
intervention can be very costly and ineffective.  Typically, in Bangladesh high rice prices 
set in motion a pressure for high public rice stocks, without attention to the fact that high 
stocks are not a guarantee that food security of the poor is properly addressed. 
Finally, the debate on stock policy has often been dominated by a 
misunderstanding of what is meant by "Optimal Stock".  Optimization requires a well-
specified set of objectives, constraints, and policy instruments.  In a dynamic context 
such as foodgrain stock policy, the optimal stock is not a single magic number.  It implies 
a sequence of numbers over a well-defined time horizon.  Over such a time horizon, the 
amount of stock will vary depending on conditions related to production, world prices 
and policy regimes.  The "optimal stock" has often been identified with the average 
amount of stock over this path of numbers.  The average is misleading because the same 
average number could arise from very different paths.  Moreover, the path for the optimal  
stock depends on the policy regime (e.g. government monopoly versus liberalized private 
sector imports) as well as policy objectives (e.g. the relative weight put on price stability 
versus number of poor household reached by targeted distribution programs).  Thus, for   
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example, the liberalization of private sector trade after 1992 changes the path for optimal 
stock by allowing private sector imports to provide additional stability to markets in 
times of domestic shortfalls. 
PRICE STABILIZATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
Stock modeling exercises have shown that using private sector trade and setting 
bands close to import and export parity is most efficient in terms of fiscal costs relative to 
degree of stabilization achieved.  With trade liberalization, import parity provides a 
ceiling, though in years of high world prices, this ceiling may be unacceptably high, 
requiring the government to subsidize imports and draw down its stocks.   
Figure 3.1 illustrates how openness to import trade adds to price stability in the 
case of a production shortfall.  With a normal harvest, short-run supply in the months just 
after the harvest is indicated by S0.  With this level of production, the market price is P0, 
determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves.  A production shortfall 
shifts the short-run supply curve back to S1.  In the absence of international trade, the 
market price would rise to P1.  However, with free trade and an import parity price of Pm 
below P1, domestic demand is Q2 and the difference between Q2 and Q1 is the sum of 
private imports, changes in private stocks and net market injections by the government. 
Note that in this case, if there is no change in private stocks,
11 net market injections less 
than or equal to M1 have no effect on the price, but only reduce the quantity of imports.  
                                                 
11 A decrease (increase) in private stocks will reduce (increase) the amount of imports, holding net 
government sales constant.  
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Figure 3.2￿Rice Prices and Quantity of Private Imports in Bangladesh, 1993-99 
 
 
Source: Dorosh (1999), calculated using data from FPMU, CMIE (1998, 1999) and Baulch, Das et. al. 
(1998). 
 
As shown in Dorosh (1999), private sector imports did effectively stabilize rice 
prices in 1997/98 and 1998/99 following major rice production shortfalls (Figure 3.2).  
Following a poor aman harvest in November 1997, domestic prices rose rapidly to import 
parity.  Prices did not rise further because a competitive private sector import trade was 
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following the massive floods of 1998, private sector imports again increased significantly 
and kept prices from rising above import parity.   
This positive experience with private sector imports does not completely 
eliminate the need for rice stocks, however.  Import parity prices in years of tight world 
markets may be unacceptably high.  In this case, subsidized sales of government imports 
(and rice stocks) may be needed.  Thus, some security rice stocks are needed, equal to at 
least about three months of planned distribution, because of delays in import arrivals.   
As shown in Figure 3.3, however, export parity, (the price at which rice could be 
profitably exported from Bangladesh) does not provide a floor for Bangladesh prices.  
Three successive good rice harvests in Bangladesh (boro 1996, aman 1996/97 and boro 
1997) brought rice prices to export parity.  Exports did not occur in part because market 
links were not established.  Also, because of the lack of uniform grades and standards for 
Bangladesh, rice would greatly reduce the price received by exporters, in effect lowering 
the export parity price below that shown in the figure (See Rahman, 1998).  Investments 
in mechanical graders and the establishment of grades and standards consistent with 
current international trade could thus help avoid large price declines by making exports 
possible following bumper harvests.  If large scale exports of rice become feasible, 
however, government negotiations with food aid donors would be necessary to ensure 
that food aid flows (almost exclusively in wheat and targeted to poor households) would 
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4.  IMPACTS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN RICE MARKETS 
The alternative to making the investments required and permitting private sector exports 
to boost producer prices following bumper harvests is, of course, government procurement.  
This chapter first presents data on the structure of rice production and sales by household and 
farm size, to provide insights on who benefits from increases in producer prices.  It then 
reviews the government￿s recent experience with domestic procurement and open market sales 
of rice, comparing government sales and purchases with market prices in recent years.  A 
simple modeling framework is also used to assess the extent to which domestic procurement 
affects market prices.  Finally, costs of fixed price procurement in recent years are compared to 
the alternative of procuring rice at the wholesale market level.   
 
STRUCTURE OF FOODGRAIN PRODUCTION AND SALES 
 
Table 4.1 presents estimates of rice and wheat production cultivated by farm size based 
on data from the 1996/97 Agricultural Census.  Production by farm size is estimated using the 
area cultivated data from the Agricultural Census and average yield data by season and type of 
rice cultivation from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.  As indicated, an estimated 42.2 
percent of rice and 48.4 percent of wheat is produced on farms less than 2.50 acres in size.  
These shares vary little by season: small farms account for an estimated 45.4 percent of aus, 
40.0 percent of aman and 40.1 percent of boro rice produced. 
Data from the 1995/96 Household Expenditure Survey give an indication of rice sales 
by farm size (Table 4.2).  Out of a total of 18.50 million farm households with a total 
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Table 4.2￿Rice Production, Consumption and Sales by Household, 1995/96 
 
   Households by Land Area Owned (acres) 
   0-0.04 0.05-0.49 0.50-2.49 2.50+ 
  
Total
Number of Households (millions)                3.32               6.87               5.70                2.61              18.50 
Population (millions)              14.30             33.65             30.87              18.24              97.05 
Average Population/Household  4.30 4.90 5.42 6.99                5.25 
    
Monthly Expenditure/Capita (Tk)            458.76           507.63           628.06            843.67            601.88 
  Share of Rice Expenditures (percent)  36.2% 34.4% 29.1% 22.8%  29.9%
    
Annual Rice Consumption (’000 tons)   2182 5473 5635 3598            16,889 
  Consumption per Capita (kgs)  152.6 162.7 182.6 197.3              174.0 
  From Own Production (’000 tons)   195 967 2771 2728              6,661 
  From Own Production (percent)  9.0% 17.7% 49.2% 75.8%  39.4%
  Rice Purchases (’000 tons)  1986 4507 2864 871            10,228 
  Rice Purchases (percent)  91.0% 82.3% 50.8% 24.2%  60.6%
    
Annual Rice Production (’000 tons)                 440             2,102             5,940              8,152            16,633 
  Rice Sales (’000 tons) (a)                 119                547             1,817              3,632              6,115 
  Percentage Sold (a)  27.1% 26.1% 30.6% 44.5%  36.8%
  Rice Sales (’000 tons) (b)  244 1135 3169 5424              9,972 
  Percentage Sold (b)  55.6% 54.0% 53.3% 66.5%  60.0%
    
Net Rice Sales (’000 tons) (a)  -1867 -3960 -1047 2761  -4113
  Net Rice Sales / Person (kgs) (a)  -130.6 -117.7 -33.9 151.4  -42.4
  Net Sales / Consumption (percent) (a)  -85.6% -72.3% -18.6% 76.7%  -24.4%
    
Net Rice Sales (’000 tons) (b)  -1742 -3372 305 4553  -256
  Net Rice Sales / Person (kgs) (b)  -121.9 -100.2 9.9 249.7  -2.6
  Net Sales / Consumption (percent) (b)  -79.8% -61.6% 5.4% 126.5%  -1.5%
 
Notes:  (a) Using rice sales as reported in survey. 
(b) Using net rice sales computed as production less own consumption. 
Source:  BBS, 1995-96 Household Expenditure Survey and authors’ calculations.  
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These small farm households accounted for 51.0 percent of rice production, 
(compared to the estimated 42.2 percent for 1996/97 in Table 4.1).  Rice sales appear to be 
under-reported in the survey as the total net rice sales are negative, indicating a deficit in the 
rural areas of 4.113 million tons in a year in which net public foodgrain distribution and 
private imports were small (240 thousand and 583 thousand tons, respectively).  Using rice 
sales computed as reported production less reported own consumption, total rice sales are 
9.972 million tons, (60.0 percent of production), and net sales are ￿256 thousand tons, 
indicating a net deficit of 1.5 percent of consumption.  Large farm households, owning more 
than 2.5 acres of land, have a significant positive net sales (4.553 million tons), equal to 55.9 
percent of their production.   
Calculating rice sales as production less own consumption, average rice sales exceed 
50 percent of production for all categories of land ownership, suggesting that market prices at 
harvest time are an important determinant of incomes for all groups of farmers.
12  
Nonetheless, low consumer prices provide a direct benefit to rural households owning less 
than 0.49 acres of land (49.4 percent of the rural population) since these households purchase 
on average 61.6 to 79.8 percent of the rice they consume.  
DOMESTIC PROCUREMENT, OPEN MARKET SALES AND MARKET PRICES IN 
RECENT YEARS 
 
Table 4.3 summarizes the performance of domestic procurement from 1987/88 to 
1998/99.  Boro procurement has been much more reliable than aman procurement. Boro 
procurement exceeded 80 percent of the target in 9 out of 13 years, and failed to reach at 
                                                 




least 60 percent of the target in only one year (1993).
13  Aman procurement, in contrast, 
exceeded 80 percent of the target in only 2 out of 12 years, (1989/90 and 1996/97), and failed 
to reach 60 percent of the target 8 out of 12 years.  In these eight years, aman procurement 
averaged only 18.5 percent of the target. 
This difference in procurement performance reflects the difficulty in forecasting the 
aman harvest and future aman rice market prices, key factors in determining an appropriate 
procurement price for aman.  In the last six years, from 1993/94 through 1998/99, aman 
procurement exceeded 30 percent of the target only in 1996/97.  In that year, the average 
price in the major procurement zone (calculated as the average price in Rangpur, Dinajpur 
and Bogra districts) was 1.65 Tk/kg below the procurement price.  In the other five years, the 
average price in the major procurement zone was an average of 1.35 Tk/kg above the 
procurement price, and procurement averaged only 8.9 percent of the target (Figure 4.1). 
Open Market Sales (OMS) of rice face a similar problem, in that no sales are possible 
when the OMS price is set above the market price.  However, since the OMS price can easily 
be changed, the government is able to increase sales when needed for stock rotation purposes 
simply by reducing the price.
14  Note that the OMS price has often been below the market  
price (Figure 4.2) indicating that the OMS price has not served as a ceiling price, since the 
quantity of OMS sales in these periods has not been sufficient to reduce market prices to the 
OMS price level. 
                                                 
13 In 1993, government rice stocks were being drawn down as major rationing channels (Statutory Rationing 
and Rural Rationing) were being eliminated.  Thus, there was little need for additional rice procurement. 
14 If the market price was already lower than the established OMS price, the purpose of OMS sales would not 
be to stabilize rice prices.  
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IMPACT OF DOMESTIC PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION ON MARKET 
PRICES 
 
Table 4.4 presents estimates of the effect of domestic net procurement on market 
prices.  Defining the boro/aus season as the seven month period from May through 
November, the table shows total availability in the period assuming no change in private 
stocks.  The implications of private stock changes and private sector imports are discussed 
below.  Procurement as a share of total boro plus aus production ranged from 2.6 to 5.1 
percent from 1996 to 1999.  However, net procurement, equal to procurement less offtake 
from government stocks, was much smaller.  Net procurement as a share of total supply 
ranged from ￿0.8 to 1.9 percent.   
The impact of net procurement on domestic prices can be calculated by considering 
net procurement as a reduction in net market supply, and then using an assumed own-price 
elasticity of demand for rice.  Thus, for example, in 1996, if the net procurement of 150 
thousand tons did not take place, net supply would have been 1.9 percent greater.  Assuming 
an elasticity of demand of ￿0.2, then the market price would be 9.5 percent lower (=1.9 
percent / -0.2) in the absence of procurement.  Or, using the simulated no-procurement price 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.4￿Impact of Domestic Net Boro Season Procurement, 1996 ￿ 1999 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 
      
Boro  7.221 7.46  7.979 10.000 
Aus  1.676 1.874 1.616 1.800 
Total Production  8.897 9.334 9.595 11.800 
      
Losses, seed, etc. (10 percent)  0.890 0.933 0.960 1.180 
      
Net Production  8.007 8.401 8.636 10.620 
      
Domestic Procurement (May-Nov)  0.416 0.243 0.322 0.602 
Offtake from Government Stocks (May-Nov)  0.266 0.307 0.289 0.538 
Net Domestic Procurement (May-Nov)  0.150 -0.064  0.033 0.064 
      
Private imports  0.046 0.031    
      
Private stock change  0 0 0 0 
      
Supply / Demand  7.903 8.496 8.603 10.556 
      
Actual Price (May-Nov)  10.19 9.75  13.24 12.50 
      
Procurement / Total Production (percent)  4.7% 2.6% 3.4% 5.1% 
      
Net Procurement / Total Supply (percent)  1.9% -0.8%  0.4% 0.6% 
      
Effect of Net Procurement on Market Prices      
Simulated Change in Price (percent)      
   elasticity = -0.2  10.5% -3.6%    3.1% 
   elasticity = -0.3  6.8% -2.4%    2.1% 
   elasticity = -0.5  3.9% -1.5%    1.2% 
 
 





The calculations described above involve important assumptions regarding spatial 
market integration and private stock behavior.  In this simple calculation, it is assumed 
that markets are integrated for the entire period of analysis and that there are no reverse 
flows in rice from urban to rural areas.  This assumption implies that prices throughout 
the country move together, with a constant margin between rural and urban prices.  
Baulch, et. al. (1998) provide econometric evidence suggesting that wholesale markets 
for rice are in fact well integrated, and except for periods of major shortages in domestic 
production (such as those just after the 1997/98 and 1998/99 aman harvests), the 
assumption that rural and urban markets are linked throughout the year seems reasonable. 
Private stock behavior, however, is much more difficult to take into account.  The 
calculations assume that the private sector has a desired level of stocks just before the 
start of the aman harvest, (for example, stocks equal to six weeks of average 
consumption).  Thus, increased net procurement of the government has a large impact on 
prices since the private sector does not respond to government purchases (and higher 
market prices) by selling some of its stocks.  In this case, total stocks (public and private) 
rise by the amount of procurement.  An extreme alternative assumption would be simply 
that the private sector, assuming that net government procurement for the period will be 
zero, may simply immediately reduce its stock levels by the amount of government 
procurement, so that total stock levels (public and private) are unchanged. 
A full model of private stock behavior would require specification of price 
expectations and storage costs of the private sector.  Simple price expectations are often 
used in dynamic programming models, but a complete specification would take the  
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expected actions of the government into consideration (Williams and Wright, 1991; 
Goletti, Ahmed and Chowdhury, 1991; Goletti, 1994; Brennan, 1995).  As a simple 
alternative, the model of the Bangladesh food sector by Dorosh and Haggblade (1997) 
allowed price responsiveness of private stock behavior through an own-price elasticity of 
stock-holding.  In this way, the effect of government procurement on prices would be 
mitigated somewhat as the private sector reduced its stocks as prices rose, thus offsetting 
part of the impact on market supplies. 
No estimate of the impact of boro procurement on average prices in 1998 is 
shown in the table since the Bangladesh price was near the import parity price with India 
throughout the May-November period.  Prices were below import parity calculated ex: 
Delhi in May and June, but were probably close to import parity for rice from West 
Bengal.  West Bengal prices are typically below those in Delhi during these months 
because of the boro (rabi) rice harvest in West Bengal (and the lack of a major boro 
harvest in most other states with the exception of Andhra Pradesh).  On average, rice 
prices in May through June in 1996 and 1997 were 9.7 percent lower in West Bengal than 
in Delhi.    
Thus, with prices at import parity, government procurement would have no effect 
on market prices, but instead would only increase the volume of private sector rice 
imports. Private imports were also substantial in mid-1999, but Table 4.4 nonetheless 
calculates a price effect of net procurement given that domestic prices were far below 
even estimated import parity ex: West Bengal.  Moreover, no import volumes are entered 
into the calculation of domestic supply because of substantial evidence that official 
figures for rice imports during this period might be significantly overstated (Dorosh,  
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1999).  Note, however, that adding the 272 thousand tons of imports would increase 
availability (net of government procurement and sales) by only 2.6 percent, and would 
thus have little impact on the calculated price effect. 
EXCESS COSTS OF PROCUREMENT 
Table 4.5 compares the procurement price to the market price in the major boro 
procurement zone (Rajshahi) to assess whether it would have been possible to procure 
rice at a lower cost in these years.  As shown, the procurement price ranged from 0.27 to 
1.88 Tk/kg above the May-July average Rajshahi wholesale price of coarse rice from 
1996 through 1999.  Adjustments need to be made both for rice quality and location, 
however.  Since government procurement standards are higher than the average quality of 
coarse rice, a quality adjustment of perhaps 0.5 to 1.5 Tk/kg should be added to the 
market price of rice.  On the other hand, procurement generally takes place at Local 
Supply Depots (LSDs) in rural areas and so the costs of handling and transport from the 
LSD￿s to urban wholesale markets must be added, in the range of 0.5 to 1.0 Tk/kg.  The 
net adjustment may be rather small and depends on the location of the LSD and the 
wholesale market. 
Thus, for example, though the difference between the wholesale market price and 
the procurement price was only 0.27 Tk/kg in 1999, the government procured 602 
thousand tons following the boro harvest.  If we use this margin of 0.27 Tk/kg as the 
quality and transport factor needed to make wholesale market prices in Rajshahi division 
comparable to the government procurement price, then the prices paid to farmers in 1996, 
1997 and 1998 were excessive by 0.54, 1.61, and 0.08 Tk/kg, respectively (Estimate II of 
the excess procurement price).  Multiplying by the procurement quantities in these years,  
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the estimated excess cost of procurement was 226 million Taka in 1996, 391 million 
Taka in 1997, and 25 million Taka in 1999.  Thus, in principle, the government could 
have met its objective of procuring rice for security stocks and public distribution at far 
lower costs.  And given that few farmers actually participate in procurement, the vast 
majority of farmers would have had the same benefits as under fixed-price procurement. 
 
Table 4.5￿Costs of Domestic Boro Season Procurement, 1996 ￿1999 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Domestic Procurement (May-Nov)  0.416 0.243  0.322 0.602
 
Procurement Price (Tk/kg)  11.00 11.00  12.00 12.00
 
Market Prices (Average May-July)   
 
   National Average HYV Coarse (Tk/kg)  10.84 9.83  12.37 12.50
 
Rajshahi HYV Coarse (Tk/kg)  10.19 9.12  11.66 11.73
 
"Excess" Procurement Price (Tk/kg)   
 
Estimate I (Procurement Price less Rajshahi 
Price) 
0.81 1.88 0.34 0.27
 
Estimate II (Estimate I less 1999 Value of 
Estimate I) 
0.54 1.61 0.08 0.00
 
"Excess" Cost of Procurement (mn Taka)   
 
Estimate I  337 456  111 161
 
Estimate II  226 391  25 0
 
 
Notes:  Private imports are not included in total supply for calculations in 1998 and 1999.  The Rajshahi 
Division price is the average of prices in Bogra, Dinajpur, Naogaon, Rangpur and Rajshahi 
districts.  Excess cost of procurement is calculated as the excess procurement price times the 
quantity of procurement. 




5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Price stabilization is an important, though somewhat ambiguous policy objective 
of the Government of Bangladesh.  Procurement prices (and OMS prices) are not true 
floor (and ceiling prices), since there is no attempt to buy all the foodgrains offered at the 
procurement price nor sell unlimited quantities of foodgrains at the OMS price.
15  
Operationally, the overriding policy objective has been ensuring smooth operation of the 
Public Foodgrain Distribution System, which has been increasingly targeted to the poor, 
particularly since the elimination of Statutory Rationing and Rural Rationing channels in 
the early 1990s.   
The reduction in the size of the PFDS in the early 1990s diminished the 
government￿s share of total foodgrain sales and consumption and to some extent its 
influence on domestic market prices.  The trade liberalization of the early 1990s also 
reduced government control on the supply of foodgrain through imports, though it 
opened up the possibility that private sector imports could stabilize markets in times of 
domestic production shortfalls, perhaps in a more cost-effective way.   
Examination of rice price variability in Bangladesh shows no clear increase in 
price instability in the 1990s compared with the 1980s or the second half of the 1970s. 
Year-to-year fluctuations greater than 10 percent and deviations from the moving average 
of more than 5 percent occurred more frequently in the 1990s than in the 1980s. 
However, seasonality of monthly prices was reduced in the 1990s, and coefficients of 
                                                 
15 Procurement of sufficient quantities to maintain an effective floor price in the market would require 
large fiscal outlays in years of good harvests and possibly substantial increases in storage capacity.    
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variation of annual prices fell sharply.  Real prices of rice were slightly more unstable in 
the 1990s, (as measured by the coefficients of variation).    
World prices of rice, (Bangkok prices for example), in contrast, have clearly 
become more stable over time, as the volume of world trade has grown.  In the 1990s, 
Bangladesh domestic prices expressed in Taka were approximately as stable as Bangkok 
prices expressed in dollars (as measured in terms of deviations from a moving average 
trend.)  Overall, the evidence indicates that Bangladesh annual prices were slightly more 
stable in the 1990s than international (Thai) prices, though Indian prices, heavily 
influenced by Indian government market interventions, were even more stable. 
Earlier stock modeling exercises suggest the importance of clarifying policy 
objectives and the limited influence and benefits of government market operations on 
domestic rice prices in the 1980s.  Given the lower price of wheat compared with rice, 
costs can be reduced or the number of people reached can be increased if wheat is used 
instead of rice in targeted distribution to the poor.  Moreover, with trade liberalization, 
private sector imports have added to price stability by effectively providing a price 
ceiling at import parity levels following poor rice harvests in 1994/95, 1997/98 and 
1998/99.  Nonetheless, rice price stability remains a concern, especially since export 
parity does not provide an effective floor because Bangladeshi traders have not 
established export contacts. 
Domestic procurement thus retains its importance.  Production instability in the 
aman season makes price forecasting difficult, though.  In five of the last six years, the 
eventual average wholesale market price at harvest was above the procurement price, 
resulting in an average of only 8.9 percent of the procurement target actually being  
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achieved.  Moreover, the procurement price set in boro season has been excessively high 
in 3 out of 4 recent years, resulting in extra costs to the government and windfall profits 
to those who are fortunate enough to sell at the procurement centers.  In addition, 
procurement prices substantially above market prices increase the potential for rent-
seeking behavior and corruption of public officials connected with procurement.  Open 
tendering has succeeded in enabling some domestic procurement following unexpected 
domestic production shortfalls in 1998 and 1999.  Technical problems remain, but if 
these are overcome, costs could be reduced and reliability of procurement could be 
increased. 
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